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Abstract: This paper explores three ways in which 
physics may involve counterpossible reasoning. The 
first way arises when evaluating false theories: to say 
what the world would be like if the theory were true, 
we need to evaluate counterfactuals with physically 
impossible antecedents. The second way relates to the 
role of counterfactuals in characterizing causal 
structure: to say what causes what in physics, we need 
to make reference to physically impossible scenarios. 
The third way is novel: to model metaphysical 
dependence in physics, we need to consider 
counterfactual consequences of metaphysical 
impossibilities. Physics accordingly bears substantial 
and surprising counterpossible commitments. 
  
1. Introduction 
It is a truism that physics involves reasoning about alternative physical 
possibilities. To explain and predict actual observations, we construct 
models of the phenomena which represent alternative physically possible 
histories; perhaps we also assign a probability distribution over these 
histories. This essentially modal character of physics has been emphasized 
by authors as varied as Sellars, Suppes, Cartwright, Ladyman and Ross, and 
Maudlin. Does physics also involve reasoning about physical 
impossibilities? This question has received much less attention. 
Why suspect that physics requires us to reason about the physically 
impossible? It is tempting to think that physicists need have no truck with 
impossible scenarios, given their narrow focus on predicting actual 
phenomena. However, there are at least three powerful reasons to think 
that the broader explanatory project of physics will incur non-trivial 
commitments concerning physical impossibilities: an argument from 
physical theorizing (§3), an argument from causal structure (§4) and an 
argument from grounding structure (§5).  
Although the argument from physical theorizing can be resisted in 
several ways, the arguments from causal structure and grounding structure 
are more robust. There are two main ways to respond to these latter 
arguments: either deny that physics tells us about causal/grounding 
structure, or accept that physics incurs substantive metaphysical 
commitment in the form of patterns of non-trivial counterpossible 
counterfactuals. Neither option will be attractive to scientific realists who 
take sceptical or deflationary attitudes to metaphysics, and so the argument 
of this paper raises a new puzzle for those scientific realists. 
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The argument from physical theorizing threatens only the necessitarian 
view that the fundamental laws of physics are non-contingent. It leaves 
untouched contingentists who acknowledge metaphysical possibilities 
featuring different fundamental laws of physics. However, I shall argue that 
every view of the modal status of fundamental phsyics needs an adequate 
response to the argument from grounding structure, and once such a 
response is in place then necessitarians can use it to resolve their problem 
with physical theorizing. One conclusion of this paper is accordingly that 
nomic necessitarianism is in better shape than is generally appreciated. 
I begin in the next section (§2) with a brief survey of views on the modal 
status of laws of physics, and summarize reasons for thinking that these 
laws are metaphysically necessary. Orthodoxy in metaphysics says that 
physical laws are metaphysically contingent, but there is little support for 
this orthodoxy beyond intuition and precedent. The most persuasive reason 
usually given to favour contingentism is some version of the argument from 
physical theorizing (§3). I argue that necessitarians have plausible responses 
to this argument. But necessitarians are not out of the woods; I next present 
the argument from causal structure (§4) and show that it escapes all the 
necessitarian responses to the argument from physical theorizing. 
Necessitarianism can in the end be rehabilitated, however, by consideration 
of the argument from grounding structure (§5), which poses a puzzle for 
necessitarians and contingentists alike. The upshot (§6) is that 
necessitarianism and contingentism are on a par with respect to 
considerations of counterpossible reasoning in physics. Scientific realists, 
whatever their view on the modal status of fundamental physics, need to 
take on some substantial commitments concerning the impossible. 
 
2. The Modal Status of Fundamental Physics 
As already noted, it is commonplace to regard fundamental physics as 
modally rich: our best physical theories describe a space of physical 
possibilities. The main controversy in the area concerns how physical 
modality relates to other forms of modality, in particular to metaphysical 
modality. The usual contingentist view is that the physical possibilities are 
a proper subset of the metaphysical possibilities. The contrary necessitarian 
view is that the physical possibilities just are the metaphysical possibilities, 
at least in so far as sense can be made of metaphysical possibility at all. 
In my terminology, necessitarians include both those who take the 
notion of metaphysical modality seriously and identify it with physical 
modality, and those who are sceptical of the notion of metaphysical 
modality and recognize physical possibility as the most permissive form of 
objective possibility. While the sceptics might resist the ‘necessitarian’ label, 
I think this is more a verbal dispute than anything else; the disagreement 
boils down to the question of whether physical necessity plays enough of 
the relevant theoretical role to deserve the title ‘metaphysical necessity’. In 
any case, this disagreement is moot here. Sceptics and deflationists 
concerning the notion of metaphysical necessity are still subject to the 
arguments in §3-5, and so I classify sceptical and deflationary approaches 
as necessitarian for present purposes. 
There is a wrinkle in the literature on the modal status of laws of nature 
that needs to be mentioned then set aside. The debate over the modal status 
of laws is entangled with a tangential debate over identity criteria for 
physical properties. Contrast the question of whether an inverse-cube law 
of attraction could hold with the question of whether an inverse-cube law 
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of attraction could govern the behaviour of the specific property mass. The 
first question concerns what patterns of nomic behaviour are possible; the 
second question concerns which possible patterns can count as patterns of 
instantiation of mass. Schaffer (2005) distinguishes two resultant grades of 
necessitarianism: 
Nomic necessitarianism: Properties obey the same laws of nature in 
every world in which they exist. 
Modal necessitarianism: The laws of the actual world are the laws of 
all possible worlds. 
Modal necessitarianism is the version on which I shall focus in this paper; 
from now on I shall drop the qualifier. Thus necessitarianism involves the 
identification of physical and metaphysical possibility, with the 
consequence that anything that is not in fact physically possible is also 
metaphysically impossible. This is the consequence which seems to conflict 
most directly with more familiar applications of counterpossible reasoning 
in physics. Ultimately, though, we shall see in §5 that even giving up 
necessitarianism does not accommodate the full range of apparent 
counterpossibles in physics. Attributions of grounding structure to the 
physical world entail counterfactuals such that implementing their 
antecedents violates not merely laws of physics but also laws of 
metaphysics. 
Why might one incline towards necessitarianism? I have already 
mentioned a sceptical/deflationary attitude towards metaphysical modality, 
which is often associated with deep suspicion of the method of relying on 
conceivability to establish possible cases; clear examples are Ladyman and 
Ross (2007) and Callender (2011). If you think metaphysical modality is an 
invention of analytic metaphysicians who took Kripke rather too seriously, 
then you are unlikely to think that there is any interesting objective sense in 
which the laws of nature could have been different. Of course, you might 
still think that other laws of nature are ‘logically possible’, but that is close 
to platitudinous: nobody thinks false physical theories are always 
inconsistent. What is at issue is what really can happen, and this is not settled 
by logic alone. 
Necessitarianism permits us to characterize objective modality in 
straightforwardly physical terms: the space of objective metaphysical 
possibilities is just the state space of the true fundamental physical theory. 
There need be no distracting ‘alien’ properties which present problems of 
ineffability, no hard questions about a fundamental language in which the 
space of possibilities is characterized. The fundamental physical properties 
are all the fundamental properties that there can be, and we may 
characterize modal space directly using our best theories in fundamental 
physics. If the actual world is wholly constituted by some quantum fields, 
then what it is to be an objective possibility is to be some possible state of 
those quantum fields. This is the first advantage of necessitarianism; it 
enables us to bring to bear the descriptive resources of fundamental physics 
to characterize objective modality generally and exhaustively. 
Contingentists need to look elsewhere for an account of their range of 
possible systems of physics. 
This descriptive advantage of necessitarianism over contingentism is 
linked to an epistemic advantage. Necessitarians need no sui generis modal 
epistemology; instead they can co-opt the epistemology of fundamental 
physics to map the extension of objective modal space. By identifying 
fundamental physical theories (or at least, our best guesses at them), we can 
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identify the space of objective possibilities (or at least, our best guess at it). 
This advantage is significant, since modal epistemology as a subfield is 
currently something of a disaster area. The main recognized method 
involves inferring possibility in key cases based on intuitions of 
conceivability; this method finds its canonical formulation in Chalmers 
(2002). Despite widespread unease about this method even within 
metaphysics, the lack of any systematic plausible alternative ensures 
ongoing reliance upon it; Schaffer (2005), for example, defends it as the 
only viable account on offer despite its problems. Necessitarianism 
provides our badly-needed alternative route to knowledge of objective 
possibility: physics itself. The resulting modal epistemology is simple, 
unmysterious, and naturalistic. 
I will briefly mention two further arguments, following Schaffer (2005) 
and Wilson (2013). The first argument highlights the rational relevance of 
laws: necessitarianism explains, where contingentism cannot, why we care 
about the laws of nature. Necessitarianism likewise explains, where 
contingentism cannot, why we hold laws of nature fixed in the large 
majority of our counterfactual reasoning. These arguments both turn on 
the less-is-more nature of necessitarianism; since there are no objective 
possibilities in which laws of nature are violated, then i) knowing the laws 
enables us to focus attention on possible outcomes and ii) holding fixed 
laws in our ordinary counterfactual reasoning prevents our being distracted 
by impossibilities. 
With this clarification of and preliminary case for necessitarianism in 
place, it is time for my first argument concerning counterpossible reasoning 
in physics: the argument from physical theorizing. 
3. The Argument from Physical Theorizing 
Physics is difficult, and false theories abound. To have any hope of 
identifying the correct fundamental theory – or even of making progress 
towards it – we need to be able to theorize: we need to be able to think 
critically about multiple theories and to evaluate them by contrasting their 
different consequences. What are we doing when we assess a given theory’s 
consequences? On one very familiar reading, what we are doing is asking 
counterfactual questions about what would be the case if the theory in 
question were correct. If quantum chromodynamics were correct, quark 
jets would be seen by the LHC - and so they are. Imminently I shall discuss 
some alternatives to this ‘counterfactual consequence’ account of physical 
theorizing; but first I shall use the account to formulate the argument from 
physical theorizing. 
Suppose some string-theory model of quantum gravity is correct. Then 
necessitarianism makes these counterfactuals into counterpossibles: 
A. If spacetime were Newtonian, it would have Euclidean geometry. 
[T] 
B. If general relativity were complete and correct, gravity would be 
quantized. [F] 
C. If loop quantum gravity were correct, there would be no spin foams. 
[F] 
Reasoned evaluation of the theories in question seems to require us to 
ascribe these counterfactuals non-trivial truth-values. This is the argument 
from physical theorizing: 
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1. Evaluating Newtonian mechanics/general relativity/loop quantum 
gravity involves assessing the (non-trivial) truth or falsity of 
counterfactuals A/B/C. 
2. We can and do evaluate Newtonian mechanics/general 
relativity/loop quantum gravity in our physical theorizing. 
3. A/B/C are counterfactuals with physically impossible antecedents. 
4. We assess the (non-trivial) truth or falsity of counterfactuals with 
physically impossible antecedents in our physical theorizing. (From 
1, 2, 3.) 
Contingentists can readily accept 4, but it spells trouble for necessitarians. 
In a necessitarian picture, there are too few objective possibilities to 
underwrite the needed variation in truth-values for the counterfactuals in 
question. 
There are two main schematic responses which necessitarians can give 
to the argument from physical theorizing. They can offer a non-trivial 
semantics for counterfactuals with physically impossible antecedents 
(counternomics), for example by appealing to impossible worlds or by 
ingeniously repurposing possible worlds, and thereby give non-trivial truth-
conditions to counternomics. That would amount to a reconciliation of 4 
with necessitarianism. Alternatively, they can deny 1 and give an 
explanation of the apparent epistemic role of counternomics in physical 
theorizing that is compatible with their triviality. I recommend that 
necessitarians adopt the latter approach, since it retains the following 
principle: 
Counterfactual Aboutness:   Counterfactuals are about how 
things stand with respect to 
genuine alternative possibilities. 
Counterfactual Aboutness is associated with the influential semantics for 
counterfactuals proposed by Lewis (1973) and by Stalnaker (1968). Though 
not entailed by the semantics, the principle forms part of a simple and 
appealing approach to counterfactuals and modality incorporating the 
semantics. It also fits neatly with the principles linking counterfactuals to 
metaphysical modality in Williamson (2007). Rather than delve into the 
literature on counterfactuals, I will take Counterfactual Aboutness as 
axiomatic and focus on responses to the argument from physical theorizing 
which retain it. Accordingly, I will not here explore potential applications 
of impossible-worlds theory to physical theorizing, although this is 
undoubtedly a worthwhile project. 
Let us focus then on premise 1, and distinguish some different ways in 
which it might be denied. I will discuss four types of response: two-
dimensionalist, metatheoretic, error-theoretic, and fictionalist. Although I 
will only be able to present each of these in barest outline and will not 
attempt a systematic assessment, my discussion ought to provide a sense of 
the range of options available. 
The two-dimensionalist response draws on the distinction between 
indicative and subjunctive readings of the relevant conditionals. In 
particular, it evaluates counterpossible counterfactuals as embedded in 




 If contingentism is correct, then if spacetime were Newtonian it 
would have Euclidean geometry.[T] 
 If contingentism is correct, then if general relativity were complete 
and correct, gravity would be quantized. [F] 
By embedding the problematic counterpossible inside a suppositional 
context with respect to which it is not after all a counterpossible, we 
‘suppose away’ the problem; relative to the supposition of contingentism, 
the counterfactuals are not counterpossibles and hence the embedding 
conditionals can have the variation in truth-value which is required if they 
are to play their intended role with respect to physical theorizing. However, 
the two-dimensionalist solution is unappealing. It complicates the 
semantics of the relevant counterpossibles, it complicates the behaviour of 
counterpossibles when embedded within broader patterns of reasoning, 
and it implausibly makes the evaluation of counternomics parasitic on a 
false metaphysical theory, contingentism.  
A more popular approach is to go metatheoretic. The metatheoretic 
response to the argument from counterpossible reasoning embraces 
triviality for counternomic counterfactuals, but denies that physical 
theorizing needs to appeal to counterfactuals. Counternomic evaluation is 
replaced by direct theorizing about models. For example, 
Ν  If spacetime were Newtonian, it would have a Euclidean 
geometry. 
becomes 
N* Models of Newtonian spacetime assign it a Euclidean 
geometry. 
While the metatheoretic response has some attractions – theorists are 
already committed to the relevant facts about models to which the response 
appeals – it also has some substantial downsides. Since it is not always clear 
whether some counterfactual is a counternomic, it will not always be clear 
whether it is a genuine counterfactual or a disguised description of models. 
But the underlying problem is that the metatheoretic approach simply does 
too much damage to logical form. N is about spacetime and its geometry. 
It is not about theories or models; reinterpreting it in such a way is ad hoc, 
and ought to be a last resort. (This failure of the metatheoretic approach 
recapitulates the failure of formalism in philosophy of mathematics.) 
Fortunately, better responses are available. 
A more plausible relative of the metatheoretic response is an error-
theoretic response. According to the error theory, when doing physics we 
reason non-trivially with counternomics but we err in so doing: there are in 
fact no non-trivial counternomic facts out there to vindicate our non-trivial 
counternomic reasoning. Nonetheless, error theorists can offer a systematic 
explanation of why we succeed in our theoretical goals despite this central 
false presupposition: the relevant metatheoretic fact about models explains 
why our practice of assigning non-trivial truth-values to counternomic 
counterfactuals succeeds regardless of our error. I think the error-theoretic 
response is more attractive than the metatheoretic response, but I still 
regard it as ad hoc and sub-optimal, for the broadly charity-hased reasons 
that make error theories unattractive more generally. Although the error 
theory is a viable strategy for a deflationary account of counterpossible 
theory evaluation, still it would be better not to have to rely on it. 
The fictionalist response has much in common with the error-theoretic 
response, but improves upon it by making better rational sense of our 
13 
 
practice of theory-evaluation. According to the fictionalist about 
counternomics, when doing exploratory physics we typically make and 
evaluate counternomic counterfactuals within the context of a pretence: we 
pretend that the antecedent (along with any theoretical background which 
it contextually presupposes) is a genuine physical possibility. What I am 
proposing here is a fictionalism about counternomics in the make-believe 
style of Walton (1990), not the fictional-operator fictionalism of Rosen 
(1990). Fictionality is not a truth-conditional operator attaching to 
sentential contents, but something more akin to a speech-act or pragmatic 
performative. The pretence may or may not reflect genuine possibility; but 
(importantly) we do not need to know whether it does accurately reflect 
genuine possibility in order to engage in the pretence. 
The fictionalist response has all of the advantages of the error-theoretic 
response, without convicting the practice of physics of systematic 
confusion. Counterfactual Aboutness is retained, both inside and outside 
the scope of the pretence. And it is antecedently plausible that physical 
theorizing does enmesh the theorizer in a certain kind of pretence. In order 
to take seriously a theory as a candidate for truth, one does have to – at 
least temporarily – shelve concerns about its potential impossibility and 
explore it as presumptively possible. 
Here a helpful analogy may be drawn with reductio arguments in 
mathematics. Since (at least classically) mathematical statements are true if 
possible, then in order to reason non-trivially about false mathematical 
claims one must be able to reason non-trivially about the impossible. 
Mathematicians may use a reductio argument to establish the falsity of a 
claim which they already know to be false (for example, when teaching 
students); in order to do this they must be able to temporarily adopt the 
pretence that the claim in question is true, and hence possible. This 
pretence is often marked in mathematics by the phrase ‘suppose for 
reductio’; in non-mathematical contexts, ‘suppose for the sake of argument’ 
seems to play the same role. 
As always with fictionalist proposals, we can ask why the fiction is a 
useful one. Some fictionalisms founder on this challenge; for example, 
modal fictionalists struggle to explain why a fiction of concrete possible 
worlds should be a useful one. However, fictionalists about impossible 
theory-evaluation in physics (as in mathematics) can offer a plausible 
schematic account of the usefulness of the fiction. It is not always evident 
to an inquirer whether a given theory (physical or mathematical) is possible 
or impossible. So, for exploratory purposes, we may give it a temporary 
benefit of the doubt. There are scenarios – pedagogical or historical, for 
example – where it is useful to be able to reason about the theory’s 
consequences while bracketing the question of its possibility. This is what 
a fictionalist interpretation of counterpossible reasoning in physics models 
reasoners as doing. 
An aside: Kimpton-Nye (2020) defends a version of fictionalism about 
counternomics although he develops the view differently; Kimpton-Nye’s 
counternomic fictionalism builds ‘according to [the] fiction’ (2020, 530) 
directly into the semantics for counternomics, and also fails to preserve 
Counterfactual Aboutness. 
All the components for the main arguments of this section are now in 
place. Necessitarians face a serious challenge, the objection from physical 
theorizing, but they can meet the challenge: deflationary accounts of the 
epistemic role of counterpossibles in physical theorizing are compatible 
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with Counterfactual Aboutness. In particular, we don’t need to soberly 
judge hypothetical scenarios as objectively possible in order to investigate 
them and the prospective theories that characterize them. We can (and I 
think physicists, like mathematicians, do) adopt a non-committal pretence 
of possibility for the sake of the argument. This provides us with a suitably 
deflationary picture of the counterpossibles involved in physical theory 
evaluation, and it disarms the threat that necessitarianism faces from the 
argument from physical theorizing. 
 
4. The Argument from Causal Structure 
Up to this point we have attended to the role of counterpossibles in the 
practice of physical theorizing: the task is to identify the correct theory. A 
very different way in which counterpossibles might be needed is to capture 
causal structure: the task is then to explicate the theory’s consequences for 
the causal structure of the world. In order to focus the discussion, I will 
presuppose an interventionist approach to causation. Interventionists 
analyse causal claims in terms of the counterfactual consequences of 
interventions: causal relationships hold only if certain counterfactuals are 
true, where the antecedents of these ‘interventionist counterfactuals’ 
specify that a suitable intervention occurs. These interventions may be 
physically impossible (Woodward 2003), and so from the necessitarian 
point of view intervention counterfactuals may be counterpossibles. If 
intervention counterfactuals trivialize, then we lack the variation in truth-
value to support attributions of non-trivial causal structure to reality. This 
is the argument from causal structure in a nutshell; like the argument from 
physical theorizing, it poses a challenge for necessitarians. 
A first problematic kind of impossible intervention is a conservation-
law-violating intervention. If the Sun were removed from the solar system 
by an intervention, the Earth would cease to move in an ellipse. So the 
presence of the Sun is the cause of the Earth’s elliptical motion. Making 
sense of this causal claim requires an intervention to remove the Sun. The 
Sun cannot simply be deleted from reality: this would violate conservation 
of energy and angular momentum. 
A second, even more problematic, class of impossible interventions 
involves changing the background structure of the physical world. If an 
intervention were to adjust the number of spatial dimensions to four, then 
the orbits of the planets would be unstable. So, the three-dimensionality of 
space is the cause of the stable orbits of the planets. Making sense of this 
requires an intervention to alter the number of spatial dimensions. 
Intervening on the dimensionality of space is physically impossible. 
Woodward himself presents the dimensionality case as an example of 
non-causal explanation, denying that there is any intervention that can 
explicate the dependence involved or help answer the relevant ‘what-if-
things-had-been-different’ question (Woodward 2003, 220). I am more 
inclined to see the case as causal in nature despite its unfamiliarity, but no 
matter; the previous example of the sun’s orbit suffices to drive the 
argument from causal structure of this section. On Woodward’s 
interpretation, the dimensionality example might instead illustrate my next 
argument from grounding structure (§5), or indeed might illustrate a 
distinct ‘argument from non-causal structure’. 
Necessitarians might try to apply one of the four responses explored in 
§3 to the challenge from causal structure. However, in the present context 
17 
 
these responses fail, since they undermine the objectivity of the resulting 
picture of reality’s causal structure. A two-dimensionalist approach makes 
causal claims true only relative to the supposition that contingentism is 
correct. A metatheoretic approach captures only causal dependencies 
amongst models, not causal dependencies in reality. An error-theory 
approach leads to an error theory of the causal claims. A fictionalist 
approach leads to fictionalism about the causal claims. The key difference 
between the argument from physical theorizing and the argument from 
causal structure is that causal structure is part of the world as physics aims 
to reveal it, whereas physical theorizing is merely a part of the investigative 
process – a ladder which can be kicked away once the correct theory is 
identified. Consequently, the argument from causal structure presents a 
more serious problem for necessitarianism. 
However, before finalizing a verdict on the necessitarianism vs 
contingentism debate, we should look again to the larger dialectical context. 
What we have here may be a symptom of a deeper problem, in which case 
necessitarians could be off the hook. To capture the full range of 
dependencies in nature, even contingentists about laws may have to tolerate 
non-trivial counterpossibles. This prospect is addressed – and endorsed – 
in the next section. 
 
5. The Argument from Grounding Structure 
The deep structural similarity between grounding and causation 
suggests that the asymmetry of grounding is reflected in an asymmetry of 
consequences of interventions. If we intervene to change the ground fact, 
the grounded fact changes. If we intervene to change the grounded fact, 
the ground fact is unchanged. Grounding claims thus entail counterfactuals 
with metaphysically impossible antecedents, as I have argued elsewhere 
(Wilson 2018a, 2018b). 
Consider the claim that the pressure of a gas is grounded in the average 
linear momentum of the gas molecules. If an (impossible) intervention were 
to ground an increased average momentum differently, perhaps by 
increasing the mass of the molecules while holding their trajectories fixed, 
pressure would increase along with momentum. But if an (impossible) 
intervention were to ground a higher pressure directly, perhaps by 
somehow amplifying the force of the impacts with the container sides, then 
the average momentum of the molecules would be unchanged. Making 
sense of this requires interventions which violate grounding principles 
linking molecular motion with pressure. The counterfactuals we need here 
are countermetaphysicals. 
The literal truth of grounding claims is therefore in direct tension with 
Counterfactual Aboutness. A two-dimensionalist approach makes 
grounding claims true only relative to the supposition that metaphysics is 
contingent. A metatheoretic approach captures only grounding 
dependencies internal to models and not grounding dependencies in reality. 
An error-theory approach leads to an error theory of the grounding claims. 
A fictionalist approach makes the grounding claims literally false: the 
grounding claims hold only within the pretence, however useful or 
extensive that pretence may be. Fictionalism about grounding in general 
has defenders (e.g. Thompson 2018). But if grounding structure is 
sometimes correctly represented by (interpreted) physical theories, then 
deflationary solutions to the problem of physical theorizing remain 
vulnerable to the problem of grounding structure. 
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The argument from grounding structure afflicts both contingentists 
and necessitarians. I see two potential escape routes: account for 
counterpossibles in terms of impossible worlds (sacrificing Counterfactual 
Aboutness), or deny objective grounding structure in the physical world. 
Only the latter option supports contingentism over necessitarianism; 
however, I take it that denying all grounding dependencies within physics 
is fairly radical. It conflicts with obvious truisms such as the claim that the 
temperature of an ideal gas is grounded in molecular motion, or that the 
centre of mass of a compound system is grounded in the masses and 
locations of its components. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has argued that physics is enmeshed in counterpossible 
reasoning. What follows for the modal status of the laws of nature?  
Necessitarians have various options for responding to the argument from 
physical theorizing (§3). These responses fail to carry over to the argument 
from causal structure (§4), which does present a distinctive problem for 
necessitarianism. However, attention to the metaphysical dependencies 
invoked by physics (§5) reveals that capturing non-contingent dependence 
is a problem for everyone. Considerations of practice in physics and of the 
content of our physical theories therefore provide no strong argument for 
contingentism over necessitarianism. This result is interesting and 
surprising in its own right, but it also enhances the overall prospects for 
necessitarianism. The laws of fundamental physics may yet turn out to 
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